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Abstract 
The rampant corporate failures in recent times both within and outside Nigeria make corporate governance issue 
an interesting and important area of research in Accounting.  The cases of Enron, Xerox, Adelphia et cetera 
internationally and Cadbury, NITEL, NEPA, NRC and many banks in Nigeria are very well known. Interestingly 
the Board of Directors as the top management of these corporate entities is where the bulk stops. The quality of 
the board, its efficiency and by extension the corporate performance of the entity could be affected by the size 
and composition of the Board as a critical element of corporate governance. Precisely the question is asked, if at 
all, to what extent do Board size, Board composition/structure, and frequency of board meetings and regularity 
of attendance at meetings by board members impact the corporate performance of companies? This paper uses 
opinions of company administrators and managers to assess their perception on the impact of Board size and 
composition and the related variables on the financial performance of Non-Financial Companies quoted on the 
Nigerian stock exchange. A total of 72 companies selected through the Taro Yameni formula were selected and 
three copies of a structured questionnaire administered to three top ranking managers/accountants in each 
company to get their perception of the impact of these board characteristics on the corporate governance and 
performance of these companies. The Micro soft Special Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) was used to 
analyze the responses presented in a 5-point likert scale. The regression showed that there is a significant 
positive relationship between the Board size, composition, frequency of meetings, regularity of members’ 
attendance   and performance of quoted non financial companies. R, the correlation coefficient which has a value 
of 0.977, indicates that there is a significant positive relationship between the Board size, composition, frequency 
of meetings, regularity of members’ attendance   and performance of quoted companies.  R square, the 
coefficient of determination, shows that (B = -02.0%; C= 80.4%; F= -22.2%; R= 40.7%) of the variation in the 
performance of quoted companies is explained by the model. More specifically, a higher percentage outside 
board membership leads to a higher corporate performance and the fewer the overall size of the Board, the 
higher the corporate performance. It is therefore recommended among others that the Board should not be 
unnecessarily weighty in size but more importantly, the Board should be composed more of outsiders with 
proven integrity, acumen, experience and skill in corporate management. This is expected to reduce drastically 
the spate of corporate failures as good corporate governance is engendered 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Wolfenson (1999), and Akinsulire (2006) all agree that corporate governance structure specifies the distribution 
of rights and responsibilities among different participants in the corporation such as the board, managers, 
shareholders and other stakeholders, and spells out the rules and procedures for making decisions on corporate 
affairs. This then provides the structure through which the company’s objectives are set and communicated, the 
means of attaining them as well as monitoring performance specified. It is generally also agreed that the Board 
of Directors (BOD) is central to the corporate governance mechanism in all market economies. In this regard 
Manne (1965), Alchian and Demtz (1972) and Bonnier and Bruner (1989), assert that, the Board is one of the 
most important and possibly beneficial internal mechanisms of corporate control being the ultimate stewardship 
reporter. The board is the primary means through which the shareholders excise control over the affairs of the 
company. The board is held responsible for all the activities of the company and even for the failure of other 
elements of the corporate governance chain. The shareholders are helped in this regard by statutory and 
regulatory provisions and institutions but by far the strength of the internal control mechanism is more germane 
to the success of the company than all external control measures. Since the internal control mechanism is 
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essentially established by the Board, the Board thus exercises utmost control over the safety, correct and most 
economic use of the resources of the enterprise. Though, all stakeholders responsible for promoting sound 
corporate governance, not just the Board, but also the management, audit committee and regulators, are 
challenged and compelled to ensure that sound corporate governance exist (Williams, 2001). But the issues of 
structure/composition and size of the BOD as a corporate governance mechanism has continued to receive 
considerable attention from academics, market participants and regulators. This is premised on the expectation 
that these issues would exert considerable influence on the overall efficiency of the BOD and by extension the 
quality of corporate governance and firm performance. However going beyond mere expectation, it is germane 
to evaluate the extent to which BOD size actually affects the bottom line of the firm on one hand and assess the 
impact of BOD composition/structure on corporate performance in Nigeria. These are tasks set for itself by this 
paper. It therefore asks such questions as: to what extent does BOD size affect corporate performance? And, 
does the percentage of outside directors significantly boost corporate performance?  The paper tests hypotheses; 
that there is a negative relationship between BOD size and corporate performance and that there is a strong 
correlation between BOD composition and corporate performance. The paper is organized in five parts. . Part 
one of the paper introduces the work, part two contains the literature review, part three the methodology, while 
part four presents and discusses the findings and part five concludes. 
 
2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. Board of Directors (BOD) 
The Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) (1990) S. 244(1) stipulates that the Directors of companies are 
persons duly appointed by the company to direct and manage the business of the company. S. 63(3) of the Act 
puts it simply that ‘’the business of the company shall be managed by the Board of Directors’’. By managing the 
business of the company therefore, the BOD is expected to control and direct, to administer and to take charge 
of, and to carry on the concerns of the business establishment. Good corporate governance demands that the 
Directors do this stewardship assignment transparently and accountably by adhering to company fiduciary duties 
and ethics (Adekoya, 2011). After all, it is the Principal- Agency theory that creates the relationship between the 
Shareholders and the BOD. The separation of ownership and control, which occurs as a result of the introduction 
of external investors, brings to the fore the agency challenge requiring the protection of the principal, in this case 
the shareholders, through an efficient oversight function by the agent (the BOD). It is presumed that the BOD’s 
effective performance of this monitoring role could be influenced by its composition and quality, its size and 
diversity, information asymmetries and the board culture (Brennam, 2006). This becomes more critical in the 
face of a growing trend in the composition of independent BODs and critical corporate committees containing a 
strong representation of non-executive (outsider) directors, (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990; Mallette and 
Fowler, 1992; and Daily and Dalton, 1994). Cho and Kim (2007) describe the outside director as one who does 
not have any affiliation with large investors or the management of the company. They neither work for nor have 
professional relationships with the corporation they govern. Pass (2002), describes outsider- directors also 
known as non-executive directors as persons who take on numerous responsibilities in the company on a part-
time basis. They may sit on various key company committees such as the nominations committee, the 
remuneration committee and the audit committee. The internal directors are the opposite; they may be the core or 
large investors or their representatives or those who represent management or labor. What values does each 
category of directors bring to the table and what should be the ideal mix of internal and outside membership of 
the BOD? According to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) code of best practices of corporate 
governance in Nigeria 2003, the BOD should be composed in such a way as to ensure diversity of experience 
without compromising compatibility, integrity, availability and independence; members of the BOD must 
possess upright personal characteristics, relevant core competencies, knowledge on board matters, a sense of 
accountability and commitment to the task of corporate institutional building.  
The outside directors ideally focus on the financial performance, seen as the benchmark of efficient and effective 
monitoring. They are more likely to dismiss poor performing CEOs than inside directors. They protect their 
personal reputations as they are given the incentive to monitor the affairs of the company. Hence their presence 
strengthens corporate governance by enhancing BOD independence from top management, greater objectivity, 
representation of multiple corporate perspectives and accountability. Along this line, Johnson et al insist that 
from the agency point of view, outsiders are more likely to carry out their responsibilities more effectively than 
insiders because the latter is likely to be reluctant to confront a CEO in a Boardroom situation. On the contrary, 
insiders would not be keen to raise the sensitive topic of CEO performance because they may in all likelihood be 
beholden to the CEO for their jobs (Zajac and Westphal, 1996).  
 
 
European Journal of Business and Management                                                                                                                               www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1905 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2839 (Online) 
Vol.5, No.26, 2013 
 
179 
2.2 Corporate Performance 
The capacity and ability of a firm to use its assets to generate revenue from its primary mode of business depict 
its overall financial health. When this is measured periodically, it forms the basis for both horizontal and vertical 
analysis and comparison. According to Demsetz and Lehn (2004), financial performance involves measuring a 
firm’s policies and operations in monetary terms which are depicted in the firm’s return on investment, return on 
assets, value added, et cetera. That is, accounting profit ratios proxy corporate performance. Corporate 
governance has been found to correlate positively with corporate performance, (Attiye and Robina, 2007) both 
seen from these accounting ratios of the firm and the movement of its price in the stock market. While the 
accounting profit ratios are measured by the Accountant constrained only by the standards set by his profession, 
the performance as reflected by the movement of its price in the stock market is measured by the investors 
constrained by their acumen, information, optimism or pessimism and general psychology. In either case 
however, Young (2000) suggests that best governance practices exert a positive influence on firm performance 
since it prevents management and controlling investors from taking initiatives to expropriate minority investors. 
This, it is argued impacts positively on the firm’s goodwill and ability to attract equity capital from prospective 
marginal investors. Hence in considering approaches to measurement of firm level financial performance, Sanda 
et al (2003), insist that this is found in social science research based on market prices, accounting ratios and total 
factor profitability where market prices are readily obtained from national stock exchanges for all listed firms. 
While profit is a flow concept, profit margin measures the flow of profits over some period compared with 
revenue and costs and thus there could be gross profit margin, operating profit margin, return on equity et cetera. 
The relationship between corporate governance and firm’s financial performance stems from the understanding 
that economic value is driven by governance mechanisms such as the legal protection of capital, the firm’s 
competitive environment, its ownership structure, CEO-Duality, board composition and size, (the focus of this 
paper), existence of Audit Committee and financial policy (Uadiele, 2010). In this light, Gompers et al (2003) 
find that stock returns are higher for firms with strong shareholder rights as compared to firms with weak 
shareholder rights. This suggests that firms with stronger or better corporate governance provisions outperform 
those with poor governance provisions in terms of profits, capital acquisition and sales growth. They also add 
that there is substantial evidence showing that weakly governed firms experience lower performance based on 
operating performance measures, lower sales growth and net profit margins. This has been corroborated by 
Khatab et al (2011) from a study of twenty listed firms in the Karachi Stock Exchange in Pakistan. 
2.4 Assessment of Current Corporate Governance Issues and Corporate Performance in Nigeria. 
Whereas in the United Kingdom approaches to best practices in corporate governance reflect a deep appreciation 
that governance should promote both accountability to shareholders and the board’s ability to manage the 
company effectively and efficiently the situation in Nigeria has been different. For instance, the key features of 
the UK best practices codified by the country’s company law and the listing rules demand inter alia;  a unitary 
board with members  collectively responsible for leading the company; division of powers at the apex of the 
company hierarchy, emphasizing the distinction between running the board by the Chairman and running the 
company by the CEO; a balance of executive and independent non-executive directors where for larger 
companies, at least 50% of the board members should by independent non-executive directors and for smaller 
companies at least two independent directors; formal and transparent procedures for appointing directors, with 
all appointments ratified by shareholders; regular evaluation of the effectiveness of the board and its committees; 
formal and transparent procedures for setting executive remuneration, including a remuneration committee made 
up of independent directors and an advisory vote for shareholders; and a significant proportion of executive 
remuneration linked to performance. The illicit activities and insider dealings of most Nigerian Bank Chief 
Executives and directors as revealed by the Governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria in 2009 shows a striking 
different scenario and summarize the level of decadence in corporate governance in Nigerian companies. 
Corporate governance is yet at a rudimentary stage in Nigeria with less than 40% of quoted companies including 
banks having recognized the codes of corporate governance, (CBN, 2006). But Nganga et el (2003) insist that 
corporate governance is a crucial ingredient in the process of encouraging domestic investment as well as inflow 
of foreign direct investment in Nigeria. They further lament that corporate governance practices in Nigeria 
reflect systemic governance problems including the inability to ensure effective capacity, constraints by 
administrators and ineffective implementation of laws. This leads to limited economic growth (Suberu and 
Aremu, 2010). And in realization of the need to align with international best practices, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) in collaboration with the Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC), inaugurated a 
seventeen (17) member committee in June 2000 in Nigeria headed by Atedo Peterside, to review and identify 
weaknesses in the current corporate governance practices in Nigeria and make recommendations for 
improvement. According to Inyang (2009), the members of the committee were selected to cut across relevant 
sectors of the economy including members of professional organization, the private sector and regulatory 
agencies. The committee submitted a draft code, which was widely publicized throughout the country and 
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reviewed in major financial centers of Lagos, Abuja and Port Harcourt to elicit stakeholders’ input prior to 
finalization. The final report was approved in 2003 by the boards of SEC and CAC. The release of the 2003 code 
marked a watershed in the development of good corporate governance practices in Nigeria. Essentially, the Code 
stipulated among other things, the separation of the roles of Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of the Board 
and most importantly, as stated earlier, that the board should be composed in such a way as to ensure diversity of 
experience without compromising compatibility, integrity, availability and independence. It remains to be seen 
how far these provisions are being implemented. It also remains to be ascertained, the extent to which the roles 
of the board as stipulated in the Code, to wit: strategic planning; selection, performance appraisal and 
compensation of senior executives; succession planning; communication with shareholders; ensuring the 
integrity of financial controls and reports; ensuring that ethical standards are maintained and that the company 
complies with the laws of the federation; are being carried out under different sizes and composition of the 
board.  
3  METHODOLOGY 
The paper adopts a survey design involving time series and sectional data on the surveyed companies. Secondary 
sources of data on the performances of sampled companies are used for analysis. The population of the study is 
made up of all the non-financial companies quoted in the Nigerian stock exchange within the period covered by 
the study. Though the Nigerian stock exchange record shows a list of 203 companies, the CBN list that purges it 
of liquidated companies and gives a list of 88 non-financial companies is used as the population. Using the Taro 
Yameni formula at 95 percent confidence level and error margin of 0.05, a sample size of 72 is selected. 
Through cluster random sampling, sample elements representing all the sections of the non-financial companies 
were picked from the sample frame. The dependent variables are corporate financial performance and elements 
of corporate governance while the independent variables are the sizes and percentage composition of the boards. 
A regression analysis is performed with the Microsoft Special Package for Social Sciences (SPSS). To enhance 
the robustness of the findings, an oral interview was conducted on the sampled firms. The interview guide 
established the effect of size and composition skew in favor of external or internal directors on the following: 
increased board monitoring, effectiveness of control, reduced financial scandal, investors’ confidence, effective 
communication, information diffusion, fastness of decision making, and financial performance/profitability. 
Responses were reduced into a 5-point Linkert scale for proper analysis employing regression, correlation, 
ANOVA, F- statistics and Durbin Watson statistics. 
4 PRESENTATION OF FINDINGS AND DISCUSION 
4.1 Perceived Impact of Board Size, Composition and Activities on Corporate Governance and Performance of 
Quoted Companies on the Nigerian Stock Market 
Primary data showing the responses of the respondents is shown on table 4.1 in Appendix I  
Table 4.1 shows a weighted average of 3.82 from the 5 point linkert scale (which is nearest to 4 in the scale) 
indicating a general ‘Agreement’ by the respondents that board size, composition, frequency and regularity of 
attendance to meetings impacts positively on the corporate governance and performance of the companies listed 
in the Nigerian Stock Exchange. Increased board size and in particular non executive directorship has had greater 
positive impact on the corporate governance tone and profitability of the companies as reflected by the higher 
weighted averages of 4.03, 4.01 and 4.03 respectively for higher proportion of outside directors and positive 
impact on the company’s corporate governance tone and performance, increase in board size and increase in the 
profitability and efficiency ratios of the companies, and the positive effect of board size on effective 
communication, coordination and decision making. Curiously, the respondents appeared not to know whether 
Investors have reacted positively to announcement of outside directors in the companies. The weighted average 
for this parameter is 3.10 which is closest to 3 in the linkert scale signifying having ‘No Idea’. The rest of the 
parameters received weighted averages closer to ‘4’ (AGREED) from the respondents signifying their agreement 
to the positive effects of board size, outside directorship composition, and efficient functioning of the board on 
corporate governance and performance of the companies. 
4.2 REGRESSION ANALYSIS  
Null hypothesis (Ho): Board Size, board composition, frequency of meetings and members’ regularity at 
meetings do not have any positive significant relationship with corporate governance and performance of quoted 
non financial companies on the Nigerian Stock Exchange. 
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Descriptive Statistics 
 
  Mean Std. Deviation N 
 corporate performance of 
quoted companies 1.4428 .89329 201 
Board size 1.2935 .67706 201 
Composition 1.2786 .83186 201 
frequency of meetings 1.8209 .85893 201 
regularity of members 
attendance 2.2189 1.22957 201 
 
Correlations 
 
    
 corporate 
performance 
of quoted 
companies 
Board 
size composition 
frequency 
of 
meetings 
regularity 
of 
members 
attendance 
Pearson 
Correlation 
 corporate 
performance of 
quoted companies 
1.000 .884 .910 .847 .835 
  Board size .884 1.000 .831 .753 .781 
  Composition .910 .831 1.000 .812 .620 
  frequency of meetings .847 .753 .812 1.000 .828 
  regularity of members 
attendance .835 .781 .620 .828 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed)  corporate 
performance of 
quoted companies 
. .000 .000 .000 .000 
  Board size .000 . .000 .000 .000 
  Composition .000 .000 . .000 .000 
  frequency of meetings .000 .000 .000 . .000 
  regularity of members 
attendance .000 .000 .000 .000 . 
N  corporate 
performance of 
quoted companies 
201 201 201 201 201 
  Board size 201 201 201 201 201 
  Composition 201 201 201 201 201 
  frequency of meetings 201 201 201 201 201 
  regularity of members 
attendance 201 201 201 201 201 
 
  
Model Summary(b) 
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate Durbin-Watson 
1 .977(a) .955 .954 .19170 .531 
a  Predictors: (Constant), regularity of members attendance, composition, Board size, frequency of meetings 
b  Dependent Variable:  corporate performance of quoted companies 
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ANOVA(b) 
 
Model   
Sum of 
Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 152.389 4 38.097 1036.667 .000(a) 
Residual 7.203 196 .037     
Total 159.592 200       
a  Predictors: (Constant), regularity of members attendance, composition, Board size, frequency of meetings 
b  Dependent Variable:  corporate performance of quoted companies 
 
Coefficients(a) 
 
Model   
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta B Std. Error 
1 (Constant) 
-.058 .035   -1.662 .098 
Board size 
-.020 .048 -.015 -.419 .676 
Composition .804 .041 .749 19.808 .000 
frequency of meetings 
-.222 .041 -.213 -5.439 .000 
regularity of members 
attendance .407 .026 .560 15.677 .000 
a  Dependent Variable:  corporate performance of quoted companies 
 
 
TABLE 4.3 SPSS RESULT ON THE  EFFECT OF RCBF ON PQC 
Particulars R R2 Adj. 
R2 
DW Standard Coefficients F Sig 
Beta T- Value 
All Firms 0.977(a) 0.955 0.954 .531 B = -015 
C=0.749 
F =-213 
R = 0.560 
- .419 
19.808 
-5.439 
15.677 
1036.667 0.000 
 
NOTE: 
R = Correlation Coefficient or Beta 
R2 = Coefficient of Determination 
Adj. R2 = Adjusted Coefficient of Determination 
DW = Durbin Watson (d) test statistic 
T-value =  Student t- test Statistic 
F = F- test statistic 
 
Interpretation on corporate performance: 
The regression sum of squares (152.389) is greater than the residual sum of squares (7.203), which indicates that 
more of the variation in the dependent variable is explained by the model.  The significance value of the F 
statistics (0.000) is less than 0.05, which means that the variation explained by the model is not due to chance. 
R, the correlation coefficient which has a value of 0.977, indicates that there is a significant positive relationship 
between the Board size, composition, frequency of meetings, regularity of members attendance   and 
performance of quoted companies.  R square, the coefficient of determination, shows that (B = -02.0%; C= 
80.4%; F= -22.2%; R= 40.7%) of the variation in the performance of quoted companies is explained by the 
model. 
With the linear regression model, the error of estimate is low, with a value of about 0.19170.  The Durbin 
Watson statistics of .531, which is not up to 2 indicates that there is no autocorrelation. 
The Board size, composition, frequency of meetings , regularity of members attendance   and performance of 
quoted companies   of 0.977 indicates a positive significance between size, composition, frequency of meetings , 
regularity of members attendance    and performance of quoted companies , which some are  statistically 
significant and other are not ( B with t = -.4.19; C=19.808;F= -5.439 and R= 15.677  ).  Therefore, the null 
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hypothesis is rejected and the alternative hypothesis accordingly accepted. We therefore conclude that Board 
size, board composition, frequency of meetings and regularity of attendance to meetings by members have 
positive significant effect on corporate performance of quoted non financial companies on the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange. 
Critically, a higher positive effect was seen from board composition and regularity of members’ attendance to 
meetings than just board size and frequency of board meetings. Essentially, the higher the board size, the higher 
the cost associated therewith. The same applies to frequency of meetings due to associated sitting and transport 
allowances. These would invariably impact negatively on the profit figures. But these higher costs can be more 
than counter balanced by a good composition of a board with higher percentage of outside board members with 
wide interests, experience, professional competence, proven integrity and honesty of purpose. A large sized 
board with irregularity of attendance by members could by counterproductive. It is therefore not just the 
frequency of meetings that improves performance but the regularity of attendance by members that make it 
possible for meaningful contributions from wide array of experience to the board strategic planning, organizing, 
directing and control of the resources of the company that makes the significant contribution to both corporate 
governance and performance.  
5 CONCLUSION 
The study was done using both primary and secondary data collected from questionnaire administered to 216 
senior management and professionals and 4 years Annual Reports respectively of 72 financial companies quoted 
in the Nigerian Stock Exchange. Using the Microsoft Special Package for Social Science (SPSS), the data were 
analyzed and hypothesis tested to find that Board Size, Board Composition, Frequency of Board Meetings and 
Regularity of attendance at Board meetings all positively and significantly affect corporate governance and 
company performance of quoted financial companies on the Nigerian Stock Market. There appears to be a 
general conflict of interest of the shareholders and that of Executive Directors which is inimical to the 
maximization of shareholders’ wealth. Little wonder that shareholders have a disdain for the excesses of 
Executive Directors and usually prefer a higher proportion of outside directors. Similarly, a larger sized board 
incorporates not only a greater number of experts from different fields but also accommodates more credible, 
transparent, selfless and dedicated non executive directors. Arbitrariness, autocratic, intimidation and over 
bearing attitudes of either the Chairman of the Board or the Chief Executive Officer of the company are usually 
cubed and checkmated by a large and Non Executive Directors- dominated Board. The probability of the 
Chairman doubling as Chief Executive Officer of the company is reduced by a larger sized and outside directors 
dominated board. Essentially this contributes positively to corporate governance through enhanced transparency 
and accountability. A sound human capital with robust intellect and experience from outside is therefore 
recommended by this paper for company boards.  
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APPENDIX 1 
Table 4.1 Perceived Effect of Board Size, Composition and Activities on Corporate Governance and 
Performance 
S/N Variable SA=5 A=4 NI=3 DA=2 SDA=1 TOTAL MEAN 
1 A higher proportion of outside 
directors on the Board of this company 
could have impacted positively on the 
company’s corporate governance tone 
and performance 
80 
 
(400) 
100 
 
(400) 
8 
 
(24) 
20 
 
(40) 
8 
 
(8) 
216 
 
(872) 
 
 
4.03 
2 A higher proportion of Non Executive 
Directors in this company has 
enhanced effective monitoring of both 
Board and management leading to 
increased protection of shareholders’ 
wealth  
60 
 
(300) 
85 
 
(425) 
30 
 
(30) 
35 
 
(70) 
5 
 
(5) 
215 
 
(800) 
 
 
3.72 
3 Higher dividend per share in this 
company has been positively 
influenced by a board size and higher 
percentage of outside directors. 
62 
 
(310) 
75 
 
(300) 
30 
 
(90) 
28 
 
(56) 
6 
 
(6) 
201 
 
(762) 
 
 
3.79 
4 Investors have reacted  positively to 
announcement of outside directors in 
this company 
40 
 
(200) 
70 
 
(280) 
30 
 
(30) 
41 
 
(82) 
15 
 
(15) 
196 
 
(607) 
 
 
3.10 
5 The overall corporate performance of 
this company has been positively 
affected by the size of the Board. 
70 
 
(350) 
100 
 
(400) 
5 
 
(15) 
25 
 
(50) 
10 
 
(10) 
210 
 
(825) 
 
 
3.93 
6 Limited board size has negatively 
affected the securing of critical 
resources for expansion and better 
performance 
65 
 
(325) 
99 
 
(396) 
5 
 
(15) 
20 
 
(40) 
10 
 
(10) 
199 
 
(786) 
 
 
3.95 
7 The profitability and efficiency ratios 
of this company have significantly 
risen with increase in its board size. 
80 
 
(400) 
100 
 
(400) 
4 
 
(12) 
19 
 
(38) 
12 
 
(12) 
215 
 
(862) 
 
 
4.01 
8 The size of the board has significantly 
influenced the effective 
communication, coordination and 
decision making. 
82 
 
(410) 
100 
 
(400) 
4 
 
(12) 
18 
 
(36) 
12 
 
(12) 
216 
 
(870) 
 
 
4.03 
9 Frequency of board meetings has 
positively affected overall efficiency 
and performance of this company 
77 
 
(385) 
101 
 
(404) 
5 
 
(15) 
22 
 
(44) 
10 
 
(10) 
215 
 
(858) 
 
 
 
 
3.99 
10 Regularity of attendance to board 
meetings by members has had 
positive impact on corporate 
governance tone and performance of 
this company 
67 
 
(335
) 
80 
 
(320
) 
4 
 
(12) 
40 
 
(80) 
10 
 
(10) 
201 
 
(757) 
 
 
3.77 
 
11 
Both corporate governance tone and 
performance have been positively 
influence by Board members’ 
professional qualifications, knowledge, 
competence, integrity and experience. 
75 
 
(375) 
80 
 
(320) 
4 
 
(12) 
34 
 
(68) 
22 
 
(22) 
215 
 
(797) 
 
 
3.71 
 AVERAGE       3.82 
Source: Field survey 2013. SA = Strongly Agree; A = Agree; NI = No Idea; D= Disagree and SD =Strongly 
Disagree. The weights are 5, 4, 3, 2, and 1 respectively. A total number of 216 respondents were surveyed. 
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